DAMNING INDICTMENT OF SPECIAL BRANCH ROLE IN OMAGH AFFAIR
Damning indictment of Special Branch role in Omagh affair
IN a 19-point analysis of information passed to Special Branch about the impending attack on Omagh, the Ombudsman has ruled that significant information was not handled correctly.
The report highlighted such a catalogue of errors and cast doubts on the affirmation of the Chief Constable that the atrocity could not have been averted. Indeed, the list of errors and omissions is so extensive as to cast further suspicion on the Special Branch agenda at the time of the bomb.
The Ombudsman has confirmed that police were tipped off about the attack and that the officer who received the call immediately told Special Branch and indicated that it was a serious threat.
The anonymous call was over ten minutes long and the report says that the caller provided considerable detail and was engaged in conversation for at least 10 minutes.
According to the Ombudsman, "Some assessment and very limited action was taken on the anonymous information in the days immediately after its receipt by the RUC."
Moreover, the report shows that Special branch failed to identify available intelligence held in respect of one those 'D' named in the call, nor did they follow up on information which showed that a person identified as 'E' had strong connections to republican paramilitaries.
James Baxter, the Sub-Divisional Commander was apparently not informed about the anonymous call on 4th August until 15th August 2000, two years after the bomb, despite the fact that a massive investigation had been launched after the atrocity.
There was a direct breach of regulations which require that the Sub-Divisional Commander be informed when a general threat is received so that appropriate action is taken. The Ombudsman reported that Special Branch should have warned the Sub-Divisional Commander.
The report indicated that the bomb could have been prevented from coming to Omagh if police had mounted road blocks.
The Ombudsman reported, "Had reaction to such a warning been to establish vehicle checkpoints the bombers may have been deterred",
however, Mr Baxter indicated that, even if he had been informed of the threat, he would not have set up vehicle checkpoints, rather, he would have taken alternative action.
People identified by the anonymous caller on August 4th as C,D,E and F have not been investigated nor had their roles in the Omagh bomb been considered prior to September 3rd 2001.
Nor has there been any investigation in relation to the handling by Special Branch of the anonymous call as recommended by the reviewing officer in the Omagh Bomb Review Report.
Mrs O'Loan concluded, "The police Ombudsman is firmly of the view that this significant information was not handled correctly. It is not possible to say what impact other action between 4th August 1998 and 15th August 1998 would have had or whether action other than that taken by Special Branch could have prevented the Omagh bomb."
IN a 19-point analysis of information passed to Special Branch about the impending attack on Omagh, the Ombudsman has ruled that significant information was not handled correctly.
The report highlighted such a catalogue of errors and cast doubts on the affirmation of the Chief Constable that the atrocity could not have been averted. Indeed, the list of errors and omissions is so extensive as to cast further suspicion on the Special Branch agenda at the time of the bomb.
The Ombudsman has confirmed that police were tipped off about the attack and that the officer who received the call immediately told Special Branch and indicated that it was a serious threat.
The anonymous call was over ten minutes long and the report says that the caller provided considerable detail and was engaged in conversation for at least 10 minutes.
According to the Ombudsman, "Some assessment and very limited action was taken on the anonymous information in the days immediately after its receipt by the RUC."
Moreover, the report shows that Special branch failed to identify available intelligence held in respect of one those 'D' named in the call, nor did they follow up on information which showed that a person identified as 'E' had strong connections to republican paramilitaries.
James Baxter, the Sub-Divisional Commander was apparently not informed about the anonymous call on 4th August until 15th August 2000, two years after the bomb, despite the fact that a massive investigation had been launched after the atrocity.
There was a direct breach of regulations which require that the Sub-Divisional Commander be informed when a general threat is received so that appropriate action is taken. The Ombudsman reported that Special Branch should have warned the Sub-Divisional Commander.
The report indicated that the bomb could have been prevented from coming to Omagh if police had mounted road blocks.
The Ombudsman reported, "Had reaction to such a warning been to establish vehicle checkpoints the bombers may have been deterred",
however, Mr Baxter indicated that, even if he had been informed of the threat, he would not have set up vehicle checkpoints, rather, he would have taken alternative action.
People identified by the anonymous caller on August 4th as C,D,E and F have not been investigated nor had their roles in the Omagh bomb been considered prior to September 3rd 2001.
Nor has there been any investigation in relation to the handling by Special Branch of the anonymous call as recommended by the reviewing officer in the Omagh Bomb Review Report.
Mrs O'Loan concluded, "The police Ombudsman is firmly of the view that this significant information was not handled correctly. It is not possible to say what impact other action between 4th August 1998 and 15th August 1998 would have had or whether action other than that taken by Special Branch could have prevented the Omagh bomb."
Further Information
Publisher: ULSTER HERALD
Ref: UH/0879
Published Date: 13-Dec-01
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