SPECIAL BRANCH FAILED TO PASS ON INFORMATION, REPORT STATES
Special Branch failed to pass on information, report states
Significant intelligence held by Special Branch was not shared with the officer commanding the investigation, or with the officer commanding the police's internal review, the Ombudsman said.
Her report said that some of that intelligence, which has been analysed by the Police Ombudsman's analysts, presented a compelling picture from which the senior investigating officer of the Omagh bomb investigation could have made informed judgments as to the possible involvement of individuals and which would have allowed for the better direction of resources.
This would have had the potential to make a difference to the outcome of the investigation of the Omagh bomb.
The report goes on:
- Special Branch failed to disclose the August 4, 1998, anonymous information or the Omagh Bomb Review Report to the Police Ombudsman
- Special Branch did not pass relevant intelligence to the Omagh Bomb Investigation Team until September 9, 1998. Evidential opportunities would have been lost as a consequence of the delay in passing such intelligence
- Opportunities for early arrests were also lost
- Special Branch and the Chief Constable were reluctant to grant access to their material to the Police Ombudsman's investigators, and failed to inform those investigators of a computer system where intelligence, vital to the investigation, was held
- Special Branch does not have detailed written Force policies and procedures for the management and dissemination of intelligence to the rest of the Force
- The deficiencies of current Special Branch arrangements for the management and dissemination of information, have been the subject of extensive criticism over many years. Notably, both Sir John Stevens in 1991 and the Patten Report in 1997 have called for significant change in Special Branch procedures
- In the absence of written policies, individual Special Branch officers make decisions about when information should be made available to officers
- It would not be possible or right to initiate any misconduct action against officers for failure to disseminate intelligence appropriately in the absence of written instructions as to how intelligence should be managed and disseminated.
Significant intelligence held by Special Branch was not shared with the officer commanding the investigation, or with the officer commanding the police's internal review, the Ombudsman said.
Her report said that some of that intelligence, which has been analysed by the Police Ombudsman's analysts, presented a compelling picture from which the senior investigating officer of the Omagh bomb investigation could have made informed judgments as to the possible involvement of individuals and which would have allowed for the better direction of resources.
This would have had the potential to make a difference to the outcome of the investigation of the Omagh bomb.
The report goes on:
- Special Branch failed to disclose the August 4, 1998, anonymous information or the Omagh Bomb Review Report to the Police Ombudsman
- Special Branch did not pass relevant intelligence to the Omagh Bomb Investigation Team until September 9, 1998. Evidential opportunities would have been lost as a consequence of the delay in passing such intelligence
- Opportunities for early arrests were also lost
- Special Branch and the Chief Constable were reluctant to grant access to their material to the Police Ombudsman's investigators, and failed to inform those investigators of a computer system where intelligence, vital to the investigation, was held
- Special Branch does not have detailed written Force policies and procedures for the management and dissemination of intelligence to the rest of the Force
- The deficiencies of current Special Branch arrangements for the management and dissemination of information, have been the subject of extensive criticism over many years. Notably, both Sir John Stevens in 1991 and the Patten Report in 1997 have called for significant change in Special Branch procedures
- In the absence of written policies, individual Special Branch officers make decisions about when information should be made available to officers
- It would not be possible or right to initiate any misconduct action against officers for failure to disseminate intelligence appropriately in the absence of written instructions as to how intelligence should be managed and disseminated.
Further Information
Publisher: TYRONE CONSTITUTION
Ref: TC/0956
Published Date: 13-Dec-01
Related Images
There have been no images archived for this article.