POLICE ACTED ON WARNING
Police acted on warning
Chief Constable rebuts long list of accusations on inquiry
By DERIC HENDERSON
POLICE acted promptly, professionally and comprehensively on the warning of a threatened terrorist attack to take place in Omagh on the day of the atrocity, the Chief Constable claimed.
He said that, under police regulations, Special Branch did not have to inform the sub divisional commander James Baxter of the threat, and, even if they had responded differently, they still could not have prevented the bombing.
Sir Ronnie said: "To suggest otherwise not only does a grave injustice to police officers who acted professionally throughout, but has also caused deep and unwarranted distress to the families of those murdered and to the injured."
Officers in Clogher, Co Tyrone, and police in the Republic were alerted after an anonymous caller, 11 days before the bombing, claimed that two men (C and D) were planning to take delivery of four AK 47 rifles and two rocket launchers.
They were to be smuggled across the border by a third man, (E), moved to the home of a family (F), and then transferred to an unknown address in advance of the attack on police in Omagh on August 15.
The officer who took the call in Omagh drove to Enniskillen, Co Fermanagh, rather than pass on "potentially sensitive" information by phone. His detective chief inspector and Special Branch officers were briefed.
Actions and inquiries were initiated immediately, but according to the Chief Constable none of the three men or the family identified had subversive traces.
A second call was expected the following night when arrangements could have been made for a meeting. But it never came.
Sir Ronnie said: "Had this call been genuine, or had it been in connection with the Omagh bomb, a subsequent call would surely have been made."
Despite what he claimed was the low grading of the anonymous information, preliminary preparations, including a physical reconnaissance, were made for a possible surveillance operation on the identified address, in case other checks proved positive.
Sir Ronnie's statement said: "Significant practical difficulties in mounting such an operation were identified, but despite the absence of the promised second phone call, this potential operation was not finally stood down until August 10."
None of those named, he insisted, had any previous known involvement with dissident republicans.
Special Branch also assessed they were unlikely to be used by terrorists for an operation of the kind of Omagh. Neither did the anonymous information on the type of attack match any other available intelligence, or fit with the pattern of previous attacks.
Of the 23 previous dissident attacks in 1998, only one involved firearms, and it was connected to the Real IRA, rather than the Continuity IRA, the organisation which was the subject of the call.
Nothing that happened subsequently called into question the accuracy of the Special Branch assessment, the report said. There was no gun or rocket attack and there was nothing to connect C and D to the firm suspects for the Omagh bomb or republican dissidents generally.
The response added: "Indeed, given the absence of any credible evidence against them, it has been the consistent assessment of the PSNI that there has at no time been any legal basis for arresting them for questioning about the Omagh bomb."
Even though the two Special Branch officers involved had retired, and were not obliged to do so, the Ombudsman's office was informed on September 28 last they were willing to be interviewed.
They had requested certain clarification on how certain aspects of the interviews would be conducted. After a delay of three weeks, the Ombudsman's office responded to the officers' questions, but it was not until early November that they received the letters.
They sought further clarification, and even though they agreed to interviews on December 5, nine days before the ombudsman's report was published, they were told the interviews would not go ahead, according to the report.
It added: "Had those interviews - which bore directly on some of the central criticisms being made by the Ombudsman - taken place, not only would the investigators have been fully aware of the comprehensive action taken on receipt of the 4 August 1998 information, but doubts could not genuinely have been cast, very publicly, on the actions of two officers who had acted promptly and professionally throughout."
The Chief Constable said the Ombudsman wrongly criticised the decision not to issue a threat warning and claimed that five days before the bombing, Special Branch had issued threat warnings to police colleagues across Northern Ireland, including Omagh.
It related to the possible use of a 4x4 vehicle in an operation of some kind and the risk of incendiary attacks. There was no intelligence before August 15,1998 that republican dissidents were planning a car-bomb attack in Omagh.
In the case of the anonymous information of August 4, the Chief Constable said the absence after assessment of any properly provenanced intelligence relating to a threat against the police meant that no requirement arose to inform the sub divisional commander in Omagh.
The General Order covering general threat messages put no onus on the Special Branch to do so. The Ombudsman's statement had misinterpreted General Order 99/91 which, he said, related to the handling and receipt of general threat messages on issue.
The report said: "It is not a mandatory instruction to circulate all information received by police relating to a supposed threat, irrespective of its assessed accuracy and reliability."
Even if the threat had been appropriate, the Chief Constable said the response would have been to increase security around police stations and limit police numbers on the ground - a standard tenet of police training.
Vehicle checkpoints would not have been mounted and the effect of a threat warning would inevitably have been to reduce the police presence in and around Omagh on August 15, rather than increase it.
Chief Constable rebuts long list of accusations on inquiry
By DERIC HENDERSON
POLICE acted promptly, professionally and comprehensively on the warning of a threatened terrorist attack to take place in Omagh on the day of the atrocity, the Chief Constable claimed.
He said that, under police regulations, Special Branch did not have to inform the sub divisional commander James Baxter of the threat, and, even if they had responded differently, they still could not have prevented the bombing.
Sir Ronnie said: "To suggest otherwise not only does a grave injustice to police officers who acted professionally throughout, but has also caused deep and unwarranted distress to the families of those murdered and to the injured."
Officers in Clogher, Co Tyrone, and police in the Republic were alerted after an anonymous caller, 11 days before the bombing, claimed that two men (C and D) were planning to take delivery of four AK 47 rifles and two rocket launchers.
They were to be smuggled across the border by a third man, (E), moved to the home of a family (F), and then transferred to an unknown address in advance of the attack on police in Omagh on August 15.
The officer who took the call in Omagh drove to Enniskillen, Co Fermanagh, rather than pass on "potentially sensitive" information by phone. His detective chief inspector and Special Branch officers were briefed.
Actions and inquiries were initiated immediately, but according to the Chief Constable none of the three men or the family identified had subversive traces.
A second call was expected the following night when arrangements could have been made for a meeting. But it never came.
Sir Ronnie said: "Had this call been genuine, or had it been in connection with the Omagh bomb, a subsequent call would surely have been made."
Despite what he claimed was the low grading of the anonymous information, preliminary preparations, including a physical reconnaissance, were made for a possible surveillance operation on the identified address, in case other checks proved positive.
Sir Ronnie's statement said: "Significant practical difficulties in mounting such an operation were identified, but despite the absence of the promised second phone call, this potential operation was not finally stood down until August 10."
None of those named, he insisted, had any previous known involvement with dissident republicans.
Special Branch also assessed they were unlikely to be used by terrorists for an operation of the kind of Omagh. Neither did the anonymous information on the type of attack match any other available intelligence, or fit with the pattern of previous attacks.
Of the 23 previous dissident attacks in 1998, only one involved firearms, and it was connected to the Real IRA, rather than the Continuity IRA, the organisation which was the subject of the call.
Nothing that happened subsequently called into question the accuracy of the Special Branch assessment, the report said. There was no gun or rocket attack and there was nothing to connect C and D to the firm suspects for the Omagh bomb or republican dissidents generally.
The response added: "Indeed, given the absence of any credible evidence against them, it has been the consistent assessment of the PSNI that there has at no time been any legal basis for arresting them for questioning about the Omagh bomb."
Even though the two Special Branch officers involved had retired, and were not obliged to do so, the Ombudsman's office was informed on September 28 last they were willing to be interviewed.
They had requested certain clarification on how certain aspects of the interviews would be conducted. After a delay of three weeks, the Ombudsman's office responded to the officers' questions, but it was not until early November that they received the letters.
They sought further clarification, and even though they agreed to interviews on December 5, nine days before the ombudsman's report was published, they were told the interviews would not go ahead, according to the report.
It added: "Had those interviews - which bore directly on some of the central criticisms being made by the Ombudsman - taken place, not only would the investigators have been fully aware of the comprehensive action taken on receipt of the 4 August 1998 information, but doubts could not genuinely have been cast, very publicly, on the actions of two officers who had acted promptly and professionally throughout."
The Chief Constable said the Ombudsman wrongly criticised the decision not to issue a threat warning and claimed that five days before the bombing, Special Branch had issued threat warnings to police colleagues across Northern Ireland, including Omagh.
It related to the possible use of a 4x4 vehicle in an operation of some kind and the risk of incendiary attacks. There was no intelligence before August 15,1998 that republican dissidents were planning a car-bomb attack in Omagh.
In the case of the anonymous information of August 4, the Chief Constable said the absence after assessment of any properly provenanced intelligence relating to a threat against the police meant that no requirement arose to inform the sub divisional commander in Omagh.
The General Order covering general threat messages put no onus on the Special Branch to do so. The Ombudsman's statement had misinterpreted General Order 99/91 which, he said, related to the handling and receipt of general threat messages on issue.
The report said: "It is not a mandatory instruction to circulate all information received by police relating to a supposed threat, irrespective of its assessed accuracy and reliability."
Even if the threat had been appropriate, the Chief Constable said the response would have been to increase security around police stations and limit police numbers on the ground - a standard tenet of police training.
Vehicle checkpoints would not have been mounted and the effect of a threat warning would inevitably have been to reduce the police presence in and around Omagh on August 15, rather than increase it.
Further Information
Publisher: NEWS LETTER
Ref: NL/422
Published Date: 25-Jan-02
Related Images
