WHY WE MUST ACT NOW
Why we must act now
By MICHAEL McDOWELL
WHAT CAN be done to "tighten up'' security against the activities of a murderous conspiracy such as the "real'' IRA? Security forces in the Republic and the UK have had some measure of success in thwarting some episodes of their bombing campaign by surveillance and interception and arrest.
But, at the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that, despite such successes, there have been several bomb outrages culminating in Omagh. Existing security responses have not sufficed. The Real IRA have made good their losses. It is difficult to accept that there has been any absence of will to enforce the law or any absence of understanding of the consequences of failing to do so.
The Real IRA is no more likely to be crushed simply by vigorous enforcement of the existing laws than were the Provos who showed that they could still succeed in bombing and maiming despite a huge deployment of security resources in Ireland and in Britain. Estimates of the strength of RIRA put it at about 100 a not inconsiderable fraction of previous estimates of Provo strength. Nor are the RIRA dissidents devoid of technical skills or a ready supply of bombs and mortars. It would be naive to think that they simply will evaporate in the white heat of public revulsion after Omagh. These people know how to hunker down and wait for public opinion to turn that has happened before.
If they can claim some martyrs of some future shoot-to-kill policy such as that claimed to lie behind the Loughall shootout they might begin to bed down in the Republican community.
If internment is introduced, some argue that it could have the same effect. Internment is not an easy solution. It never was. It is a drastic step.
But it may be the only adequate response.
The State has an obligation not merely to arrest charge, convict and imprison murderers after the event it also has an obligation to prevent murder. And where the ordinary criminal law will not stop a campaign of murder, the State must deploy whatever measures are required to do so. The safety of the people and their state is the over-riding consideration - Salus Populi Suprema Lex. Short of selective, targeted internment of those believed to be involved in in RIRA are there any new laws that might be introduced? The "evidence of opinion'' membership provisions brought in by Des O'Malley in 1972 have subsequently proved difficult to operate in the face of a more sophisticated campaign of perjured denial by IRA activists. Perhaps it would be possible to restate a general anti-terrorist law which would criminalise association with proscribed persons, allowing a defence of proven innocent association. Perhaps we could criminalise behaviour and associating with persons in a manner which give rise to a reasonable inference that they are connected with or supportive of the activities of proscribed organisations and proscribed persons. It is possible to provide for criminal inferences to be drawn from involvement with documents or activities. It is probably unnecessary for the RIRA to be proscribed separately. We have no end of possible minor amendments to the law of evidence to consider. But there is no reason to hope that tweaking the rules of evidence will produce radically different results still less by mutilating the law of evidence. All of that was tried in the Diplock courts.
In the day of the mobile phone, there is no reason to believe that the evil godfathers will ever leave a criminal trail. Nor will there be a reliable supply of insider, supergrass evidence to nail the wrong-doers. The odds are against the onus of proof being satisfied in any criminal proceedings worthy of the name. The Provos' Army Council functioned for 20 years without effective penetration by the criminal law. The idea of reintroducing lengthy detention in police custody such as the seven day detention provided for in 1976 or as prescribed now for suspected drug traffickers may commend itself to some. But we ought not to forget the Heavy Gang allegations. If detention is meant to produce confessions, there is a ready incentive for police violence leading in turn to miscarriages of justice.
The problem with such laws is that they tend to warp and bend the idea of criminal law, distorting it beyond recognition. They make prosecutors of judges effectively degrading the constitution to protect the constitution. It may be more honest to implement internment than to pretend that its objects can be achieved by describing some similar process as a trial.
Perhaps there is an argument for a huge increase in Garda surveillance funded by a huge overtime bill without any radically new law. But there are obviously some people involved who are unknown to the Gardai. If we put the same blanket arrangements into effect as were used to seal the border against the BES threat, it could be argued that no other step was necessary. I doubt it. Maybe it would be a help if the suspected membership of RIRA was named under Dail privilege so that the public could identify the people involved and the media could put the spotlight on them. But for how long. If internment has to come it could be done in a more intelligent, discriminating way than happened in the past. Internees could be selected by a rigorous process. They could be given a way out of violence. It could be time limited. If introduced on both sides of the Border, it could act as a huge disincentive to any renewed Loyalist murder campaign. Internment is arguably not as draconian as some claim. In most cases the innocent or reformed internee can walk free if he persuades the authorities that he is innocent and intends to have nothing to do with terrorism and convincingly dissociates himself from subversion.
The argument that internment produces nothing but martyrs is however, one which must be evaluated carefully rather than dismissed out of hand.
But the danger is that if the RIRA tidies up its act and concentrates on murdering "legitimate targets'' there is no reason to believe that they will "go away'' to coin a phrase. Their friends will start a parallel political movement. They will develop sneaking regarder fifth columnists in the media. And they will bomb again, murder again, lie again, recruit again and start the whole cycle all over again. Some years later they may even end up at a negotiating table negotiating yet another variant of Sunningdale. If the RIRA keeps up its campaign of violence, there is every reason to fear that disillusioned hardline Provos will jump ship and join them rather than stick to their desks in the Sunningdale for Slow Learners classroom.
I prefer to think that Omagh will persuade the Government to do what the Taoiseach said he would do crush the RIRA ruthlessly now. Before they get martyrs; before they get their act together, before they kill scores of legitimate targets; and before Noraid sends them loads of M15s, shillelaghs, dollars. Before they bring down the Good Friday agreement. Internment is a measure of last resort but with a statute book full of other repressive security laws none of which stopped the Provos, there will have to be a very convincing alternative package.
The Government has to listen to experts but they also will have to convince the ordinary public either that the war is over (a task which could be assisted by Sinn Fein saying so) or else that the government intends winning the war soon. The great majority of Irish people want peace based on the Good Friday agreement warts and all. And that agreement is a delicate sapling that will simply perish in a gale of violence.
A small minority want civil war on this island. The next few days may well decide which we get.
By MICHAEL McDOWELL
WHAT CAN be done to "tighten up'' security against the activities of a murderous conspiracy such as the "real'' IRA? Security forces in the Republic and the UK have had some measure of success in thwarting some episodes of their bombing campaign by surveillance and interception and arrest.
But, at the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that, despite such successes, there have been several bomb outrages culminating in Omagh. Existing security responses have not sufficed. The Real IRA have made good their losses. It is difficult to accept that there has been any absence of will to enforce the law or any absence of understanding of the consequences of failing to do so.
The Real IRA is no more likely to be crushed simply by vigorous enforcement of the existing laws than were the Provos who showed that they could still succeed in bombing and maiming despite a huge deployment of security resources in Ireland and in Britain. Estimates of the strength of RIRA put it at about 100 a not inconsiderable fraction of previous estimates of Provo strength. Nor are the RIRA dissidents devoid of technical skills or a ready supply of bombs and mortars. It would be naive to think that they simply will evaporate in the white heat of public revulsion after Omagh. These people know how to hunker down and wait for public opinion to turn that has happened before.
If they can claim some martyrs of some future shoot-to-kill policy such as that claimed to lie behind the Loughall shootout they might begin to bed down in the Republican community.
If internment is introduced, some argue that it could have the same effect. Internment is not an easy solution. It never was. It is a drastic step.
But it may be the only adequate response.
The State has an obligation not merely to arrest charge, convict and imprison murderers after the event it also has an obligation to prevent murder. And where the ordinary criminal law will not stop a campaign of murder, the State must deploy whatever measures are required to do so. The safety of the people and their state is the over-riding consideration - Salus Populi Suprema Lex. Short of selective, targeted internment of those believed to be involved in in RIRA are there any new laws that might be introduced? The "evidence of opinion'' membership provisions brought in by Des O'Malley in 1972 have subsequently proved difficult to operate in the face of a more sophisticated campaign of perjured denial by IRA activists. Perhaps it would be possible to restate a general anti-terrorist law which would criminalise association with proscribed persons, allowing a defence of proven innocent association. Perhaps we could criminalise behaviour and associating with persons in a manner which give rise to a reasonable inference that they are connected with or supportive of the activities of proscribed organisations and proscribed persons. It is possible to provide for criminal inferences to be drawn from involvement with documents or activities. It is probably unnecessary for the RIRA to be proscribed separately. We have no end of possible minor amendments to the law of evidence to consider. But there is no reason to hope that tweaking the rules of evidence will produce radically different results still less by mutilating the law of evidence. All of that was tried in the Diplock courts.
In the day of the mobile phone, there is no reason to believe that the evil godfathers will ever leave a criminal trail. Nor will there be a reliable supply of insider, supergrass evidence to nail the wrong-doers. The odds are against the onus of proof being satisfied in any criminal proceedings worthy of the name. The Provos' Army Council functioned for 20 years without effective penetration by the criminal law. The idea of reintroducing lengthy detention in police custody such as the seven day detention provided for in 1976 or as prescribed now for suspected drug traffickers may commend itself to some. But we ought not to forget the Heavy Gang allegations. If detention is meant to produce confessions, there is a ready incentive for police violence leading in turn to miscarriages of justice.
The problem with such laws is that they tend to warp and bend the idea of criminal law, distorting it beyond recognition. They make prosecutors of judges effectively degrading the constitution to protect the constitution. It may be more honest to implement internment than to pretend that its objects can be achieved by describing some similar process as a trial.
Perhaps there is an argument for a huge increase in Garda surveillance funded by a huge overtime bill without any radically new law. But there are obviously some people involved who are unknown to the Gardai. If we put the same blanket arrangements into effect as were used to seal the border against the BES threat, it could be argued that no other step was necessary. I doubt it. Maybe it would be a help if the suspected membership of RIRA was named under Dail privilege so that the public could identify the people involved and the media could put the spotlight on them. But for how long. If internment has to come it could be done in a more intelligent, discriminating way than happened in the past. Internees could be selected by a rigorous process. They could be given a way out of violence. It could be time limited. If introduced on both sides of the Border, it could act as a huge disincentive to any renewed Loyalist murder campaign. Internment is arguably not as draconian as some claim. In most cases the innocent or reformed internee can walk free if he persuades the authorities that he is innocent and intends to have nothing to do with terrorism and convincingly dissociates himself from subversion.
The argument that internment produces nothing but martyrs is however, one which must be evaluated carefully rather than dismissed out of hand.
But the danger is that if the RIRA tidies up its act and concentrates on murdering "legitimate targets'' there is no reason to believe that they will "go away'' to coin a phrase. Their friends will start a parallel political movement. They will develop sneaking regarder fifth columnists in the media. And they will bomb again, murder again, lie again, recruit again and start the whole cycle all over again. Some years later they may even end up at a negotiating table negotiating yet another variant of Sunningdale. If the RIRA keeps up its campaign of violence, there is every reason to fear that disillusioned hardline Provos will jump ship and join them rather than stick to their desks in the Sunningdale for Slow Learners classroom.
I prefer to think that Omagh will persuade the Government to do what the Taoiseach said he would do crush the RIRA ruthlessly now. Before they get martyrs; before they get their act together, before they kill scores of legitimate targets; and before Noraid sends them loads of M15s, shillelaghs, dollars. Before they bring down the Good Friday agreement. Internment is a measure of last resort but with a statute book full of other repressive security laws none of which stopped the Provos, there will have to be a very convincing alternative package.
The Government has to listen to experts but they also will have to convince the ordinary public either that the war is over (a task which could be assisted by Sinn Fein saying so) or else that the government intends winning the war soon. The great majority of Irish people want peace based on the Good Friday agreement warts and all. And that agreement is a delicate sapling that will simply perish in a gale of violence.
A small minority want civil war on this island. The next few days may well decide which we get.
Further Information
Publisher: IRISH INDEPENDENT
Ref: II/047
Published Date: 18-Aug-98
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