THE REPORT'S MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THE OMAGH REPORT
The report's main findings
>Police had two advance warnings - one on August 4 and another on August 12 1998 - about plans to attack Omagh
>Special Branch officers failed to pass on information warning of threatened dissident Republican attacks, including one in Omagh on the day of the bomb
>There were "significant and fundamental errors" in the police investigation into the bombing
>The judgment and leadership of the Chief Constable and Assistant Chief Constable was "seriously flawed"
>As a result the chances of detaining and convicting the Omagh bombers was "significantly reduced"
>"The victims, their families, the people of Omagh and officers of the RUC have been let down by defective leadership, poor judgement and a lack of urgency"
>The ombudsman identified 360 intelligence documents of "varying degrees of relevance" to the bombing but found that 78% of these were not
passed on to the investigative team
>It was established that "the bomb car (the murder weapon) was deposited in a car park with a tarpaulin over it and that it had rusted"
>A senior officer in the investigation was refused access to Army and Special Branch video footage from South Armagh, which hampered lines of
inquiry
>Around two months after the attack substantial resources were removed from the investigation and staff numbers were cut back
>It is unclear whether the atrocity could have been prevented if RUC had taken more action over all information received between 4 and 15 August
Recommendations
>Omagh bomb investigation should be led by an independent senior investigation officer
>An officer from an outside police force should be appointed to conduct an inquiry into the potentially linked terrorist incidents identified in the report
>The role and function of Special Branch should be reviewed to guarantee a flow of information with other sections of the Police Service of Northern Ireland
>All relevant intelligence should be passed to senior investigation officers in the Omagh bomb investigation
>A review of terrorist-linked murder inquiries should be carried out, including an examination of the lines of communication and sharing of intelligence
The report's main findings
>Police had two advance warnings - one on August 4 and another on August 12 1998 - about plans to attack Omagh
>Special Branch officers failed to pass on information warning of threatened dissident Republican attacks, including one in Omagh on the day of the bomb
>There were "significant and fundamental errors" in the police investigation into the bombing
>The judgment and leadership of the Chief Constable and Assistant Chief Constable was "seriously flawed"
>As a result the chances of detaining and convicting the Omagh bombers was "significantly reduced"
>"The victims, their families, the people of Omagh and officers of the RUC have been let down by defective leadership, poor judgement and a lack of urgency"
>The ombudsman identified 360 intelligence documents of "varying degrees of relevance" to the bombing but found that 78% of these were not
passed on to the investigative team
>It was established that "the bomb car (the murder weapon) was deposited in a car park with a tarpaulin over it and that it had rusted"
>A senior officer in the investigation was refused access to Army and Special Branch video footage from South Armagh, which hampered lines of
inquiry
>Around two months after the attack substantial resources were removed from the investigation and staff numbers were cut back
>It is unclear whether the atrocity could have been prevented if RUC had taken more action over all information received between 4 and 15 August
Recommendations
>Omagh bomb investigation should be led by an independent senior investigation officer
>An officer from an outside police force should be appointed to conduct an inquiry into the potentially linked terrorist incidents identified in the report
>The role and function of Special Branch should be reviewed to guarantee a flow of information with other sections of the Police Service of Northern Ireland
>All relevant intelligence should be passed to senior investigation officers in the Omagh bomb investigation
>A review of terrorist-linked murder inquiries should be carried out, including an examination of the lines of communication and sharing of intelligence
Further Information
Publisher: BELFAST TELEGRAPH
Ref: BT/0807
Published Date: 13-Dec-01
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