BLAIR'S PLEDGES PRISE OPEN DOOR TO A GREAT FRIDAY
In the final extract from his book, Making Peace, Senator George Mitchell tells how Prime Minister Tony Blair gave Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble the assurances he needed to make agreement on Good Friday possible
Blair's pledges prise open door to a great Friday
WHEN (David) Trimble received the final draft on Friday morning, he took it apart and distributed sections of it to the ten or twelve members of his negotiating team.
So many other party leaders and members had come to Stormont that the room assigned to the UUP was now overcrowded.
So they took over adjacent space which had been used by the UKUP; it had been vacant since (Robert) McCartney and his colleagues had walked out months earlier.
There was real irony in that the UUP making a decision critical to its future, and that of Northern Ireland, in the office of its bitter rival.
After they had gone through the document, section by section, line by line, they listed and discussed their objections.
There were many, but two were critical: the release of prisoners; and whether or not Sinn Fein would be able to serve in the executive of the new Assembly if, by the time of its formation, the IRA had not yet decommissioned any weapons.
The UUP needed reassurance on those two issues. So they went to the only place they felt they could get reassurance.
At about mid-afternoon, five of the highest UUP officials, led by Trimble, met with Blair. They laid out their concerns. With consummate skill and understanding, Blair reassured them. He could not at this late stage change the Agreement, especially the section on prisoners. But he would put his reassuring words into a side letter.
The Ulster Unionists returned to their office, where they briefed their party colleagues. There had been many interruptions to their meeting, and they knew time was running out, so they locked the door.
Blair quickly prepared and signed the letter of reassurance and dispatched a top aide to deliver it to Trimble. But when the aide arrived at the UUP office, the door was locked and he could not get in.
Unaware that the letter itself was outside trying to get in, Trimble and his colleagues continued to discuss it behind the locked door.
Finally, the aide got the attention of someone near the door. The letter was handed to Trimble, who read it and handed it to John Taylor. He read it and passed it around to the party leaders.
The letter from Blair to Trimble read: ". . . if, during the course of the first six months of the shadow Assembly or the Assembly itself, these provisions (in the Agreement) have shown to be ineffective, we will support changes to these provisions to enable them to be made properly effective in preventing (those not committed to exclusively peaceful means) from holding office . . ."
Most of the leaders seemed satisfied. After more intense debate among the talks team and the others in the room, Trimble ended the discussion.
"It's my intention to call George Mitchell and tell him that we're ready to proceed."
And he did.
Why did Trimble take that fateful step? He, like every other human being, is a complex mixture, of hopes and fears, dreams and anxieties, biases and prejudices. He, like every political leader I have ever met, mixes high ideals, wanting "to do good", with driving ambition, wanting "to be recognised". He ended up accomplishing both.
Each day of the nearly two years of the negotiations was for him a struggle to avoid being thrown off balance. Attacked daily by some unionists for selling out the Union, criticised often by some nationalists for recalcitrance, he threaded his way through a minefield of problems, guided by his intelligence, his sure grasp of the political situation, and his determination to reach agreement.
I believe that, in the end, Trimble did the right thing for the right reason: he saw the opportunity to end a long and bitter conflict, and he did not want to go down in the history books as the man who let it pass.
Trimble was able to override the dissension in the UUP because he had the support of his party's most senior and influential members. John Taylor, the deputy leader, is a Member of Parliament; known for his gruff demeanor and tough talk, he is a shrewd and skilful negotiator.
Ken Maginnis is also a Member of Parliament and the party's security spokesman; a former officer in the Ulster Defence Regiment, he is regarded as moderate on cross-community issues. Reg Empey, a former Lord Mayor of Belfast, was able to reach across the divide that separates the two communities; as a result, he was respected by all of the participants in the negotiations.
Trimble called me at 4.45pm, and told me that the Ulster Unionists "were ready to do the business."
I asked my staff to immediately notify the governments and the other parties that we would meet in plenary session at five o'clock to vote on the Agreement.
We had met in this room many times before. But this time it was different.
The shape of the table was changed from square to rectangular to take up less room. That made it possible to let in some of the hundreds of the members of the parties who had come to witness history in the making.
The place was packed with people standing, in a solid mass, behind the seated delegates.
For the first time there were television cameras in the room.
The British government's Northern Ireland Office had worked out a media plan to permit an announcement to be made immediately after the vote. But the technicians jumped the gun, and the proceedings went live several minutes before the vote.
So as the world watched, the governments and the parties voted for the Agreement. Sinn Fein had to wait a few weeks, for an endorsement by its party convention, but Gerry Adams's words were encouraging and supportive.
It was one of the most emotional moments of my life, but I tried to remain calm as I made the announcement.
Extracted from Making Peace by Senator George Mitchell, published by Hutchinson, price �17.99
Blair's pledges prise open door to a great Friday
WHEN (David) Trimble received the final draft on Friday morning, he took it apart and distributed sections of it to the ten or twelve members of his negotiating team.
So many other party leaders and members had come to Stormont that the room assigned to the UUP was now overcrowded.
So they took over adjacent space which had been used by the UKUP; it had been vacant since (Robert) McCartney and his colleagues had walked out months earlier.
There was real irony in that the UUP making a decision critical to its future, and that of Northern Ireland, in the office of its bitter rival.
After they had gone through the document, section by section, line by line, they listed and discussed their objections.
There were many, but two were critical: the release of prisoners; and whether or not Sinn Fein would be able to serve in the executive of the new Assembly if, by the time of its formation, the IRA had not yet decommissioned any weapons.
The UUP needed reassurance on those two issues. So they went to the only place they felt they could get reassurance.
At about mid-afternoon, five of the highest UUP officials, led by Trimble, met with Blair. They laid out their concerns. With consummate skill and understanding, Blair reassured them. He could not at this late stage change the Agreement, especially the section on prisoners. But he would put his reassuring words into a side letter.
The Ulster Unionists returned to their office, where they briefed their party colleagues. There had been many interruptions to their meeting, and they knew time was running out, so they locked the door.
Blair quickly prepared and signed the letter of reassurance and dispatched a top aide to deliver it to Trimble. But when the aide arrived at the UUP office, the door was locked and he could not get in.
Unaware that the letter itself was outside trying to get in, Trimble and his colleagues continued to discuss it behind the locked door.
Finally, the aide got the attention of someone near the door. The letter was handed to Trimble, who read it and handed it to John Taylor. He read it and passed it around to the party leaders.
The letter from Blair to Trimble read: ". . . if, during the course of the first six months of the shadow Assembly or the Assembly itself, these provisions (in the Agreement) have shown to be ineffective, we will support changes to these provisions to enable them to be made properly effective in preventing (those not committed to exclusively peaceful means) from holding office . . ."
Most of the leaders seemed satisfied. After more intense debate among the talks team and the others in the room, Trimble ended the discussion.
"It's my intention to call George Mitchell and tell him that we're ready to proceed."
And he did.
Why did Trimble take that fateful step? He, like every other human being, is a complex mixture, of hopes and fears, dreams and anxieties, biases and prejudices. He, like every political leader I have ever met, mixes high ideals, wanting "to do good", with driving ambition, wanting "to be recognised". He ended up accomplishing both.
Each day of the nearly two years of the negotiations was for him a struggle to avoid being thrown off balance. Attacked daily by some unionists for selling out the Union, criticised often by some nationalists for recalcitrance, he threaded his way through a minefield of problems, guided by his intelligence, his sure grasp of the political situation, and his determination to reach agreement.
I believe that, in the end, Trimble did the right thing for the right reason: he saw the opportunity to end a long and bitter conflict, and he did not want to go down in the history books as the man who let it pass.
Trimble was able to override the dissension in the UUP because he had the support of his party's most senior and influential members. John Taylor, the deputy leader, is a Member of Parliament; known for his gruff demeanor and tough talk, he is a shrewd and skilful negotiator.
Ken Maginnis is also a Member of Parliament and the party's security spokesman; a former officer in the Ulster Defence Regiment, he is regarded as moderate on cross-community issues. Reg Empey, a former Lord Mayor of Belfast, was able to reach across the divide that separates the two communities; as a result, he was respected by all of the participants in the negotiations.
Trimble called me at 4.45pm, and told me that the Ulster Unionists "were ready to do the business."
I asked my staff to immediately notify the governments and the other parties that we would meet in plenary session at five o'clock to vote on the Agreement.
We had met in this room many times before. But this time it was different.
The shape of the table was changed from square to rectangular to take up less room. That made it possible to let in some of the hundreds of the members of the parties who had come to witness history in the making.
The place was packed with people standing, in a solid mass, behind the seated delegates.
For the first time there were television cameras in the room.
The British government's Northern Ireland Office had worked out a media plan to permit an announcement to be made immediately after the vote. But the technicians jumped the gun, and the proceedings went live several minutes before the vote.
So as the world watched, the governments and the parties voted for the Agreement. Sinn Fein had to wait a few weeks, for an endorsement by its party convention, but Gerry Adams's words were encouraging and supportive.
It was one of the most emotional moments of my life, but I tried to remain calm as I made the announcement.
Extracted from Making Peace by Senator George Mitchell, published by Hutchinson, price �17.99
Further Information
Publisher: BELFAST TELEGRAPH
Ref: BT/0573
Published Date: 09-Apr-99
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