DRACONIAN MEASURE USED TO STAMP OUT TERROR BID
A draconian measure used to stamp out terror bid
THE Dublin government's use of internment and other draconian security measures to deal with terrorist threats to life and limb can be traced back to the Irish Civil War in 1922-23 in which some 5,000 died.
The split in the Dail and the IRA over the Treaty led directly to the bitter conflict between the pro-Treaty government of William T Cosgrave and the anti-Treaty IRA (known as the 'irregulars') and their political mentor, former president Eamon de Valera.
Following the death of Michael Collins in an "Irregular' ambush, Cosgrave and his colleagues - mostly former republican activists themselves - determined to stamp out what they saw as an armed conspiracy against the expressed will of the people. In October 1922 the government gave the army special emergency powers to crush those 'engaged in insurrection and rebellion against the state.'
As well as the use of internment - also imposed in the north in the 1920s - those found in possession of illegal arms could be summarily executed.
For their part, the anti-Treatyites set up a rival Republican government 'in exile' with de Valera as president. Then, as now, extreme republicans based their right to wage 'armed struggle' on the 1918 election result and the Second (pre-partition) Dail.
Whereas Collins had hesitated to grapple with former IRA comrades from the Anglo-Irish War, Cosgrave and his associates had no such scruples. Thus, when the IRA placed 30 pro-government TDs on a death-list, the government's response was swift and shattering. Erskine Childers, the IRA's chief propagandist, was summarily executed - ironically for the possession of a miniature revolver presented to him by Michael Collins some months before.
Despite charges of political murder from many quarters, the Cosgrave Cabinet buttressed by the strident support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, continued its hardline stance against a backcloth of ambushes and attacks.
In December 1922, following the assassination of a Government TD, the Cosgrave government ordered the execution without any judicial process of four prominent IRA leaders captured at the beginning of the civil war. One of these, Joe McKelvey was a major IRA figure in Belfast.
In all, 77 republicans were executed by the Cumann na nGaedhael government and 13,000 interned or imprisoned during the ten-month civil strife. Cosgrave's stringent policy was to engender enduring bitterness in the Free State but it was undoubtedly successful in sapping the morale of the IRA.
As a result, de Valera and the South Armagh IRA leader, Frank Aiken (later an Irish Minister of External Affairs and architect of the Lemass-O'Neill meetings) were forced to call a ceasefire in 1923.
But the end of hostilities involved no surrender of arms nor an amnesty for prisoners. Indeed, de Valera, arrested at an election meeting in Ennis after the cessation, was interned for a year in Kilmainham Jail without trial.
De Valera remained on civil terms with the IRA until his return to power in 1932 at the head of a Fianna Fail administration. At first he sought to woo militant republicanism towards constitutional politics, authorising the mass release of IRA prisoners from the previous regime and lifting the order banning the organisation.
However, a significant section of republicanism rejected his step-by-step policy towards the goal of a united republic. In 1936, following the brutal murder of a 72-year old retired Royal Navy admiral in Co Cork, de Valera acted remorselessly against his erstwhile allies.
In June 1936, the IRA was proclaimed an illegal body and its Chief of Staff imprisoned. A stern de Valera told the Dail that the existence of private armies was a recipe for civil war and would not be tolerated. The honeymoon was truly over.
The IRA continued its activities and in 1939 launched a major bombing campaign in Britain which reached a bloody climax in Coventry where a bomb in a crowded city street left five people dead and 80 wounded. Outraged by such atrocities and an embarrassing raid on the Irish Army's armoury at Phoenix Park, de Valera acted rigorously.
Nineteen thirty nine saw the passage of the Offences Against the State Act providing for the internment of suspects. However, the new Act contained legal loop-holes and in 1940, in a determined effort to thwart any IRA threat to Eire's neutrality in the Second World War, the Flanna Fail government introduced an Emergency Powers Act giving it absolute authority to intern Irish citizens as well as aliens during the war emergency.
Over a 1,000 suspects were incarcerated in the Curragh for the duration of the war. This was matched by internment north of the border while, in Britain two IRA men, Barnes and McCormick, were executed by their part in the Coventry bombing.
The events of the 40s, in particular, were to mark out de Valera as one of the IRA's most ruthless antagonists. In all, nine IRA men were executed in Southern Ireland during the war while three others were allowed to die on hunger-strike. Among these was Sean MacCaughey, the IRA's Chief of Staff.
By the end of the war even de Valera's most inveterate critics could not accuse the former 1916 leader of being 'soft' on republican violence.
As a result largely of Dev's repressive measures, the IRA was a spent force by 1945. But it was to re-emerge in the 'border campaign' of 1956-62. Once again, the Dublin and Stormont governments responded to the series of cross-border raids with internment.
This factor together with the almost total lack of nationalist support for the campaign in the north - a fact admitted by the IRA in their ceasefire statement - brought the violence to a desultory end in February 1962.
One of the most striking aspects of the 50s campaign was the high degree of co-operation which existed between the RUC and the Garda Siochana, a fact constantly acknowledged in contemporary Stormont Cabinet papers. This factor, however, was dramatically absent in 1971 when the then Stormont Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner sought to use internment to curb the Provisional IRA.
Then, the almost total alienation of the nationalist population together with poor intelligence and the one-sided nature of the sweeps, ensured that the use of the age-old weapon would prove totally counter-productive.
Short of internment the Fianna Fail and Coalition governments of the 1970s invoked the full rigour of the law against paramilitaries. In December 1972, against a bloody backdrop of loyalist bombs in Dublin, the Dail amended the Offences Against the State Act empowering the courts to imprison suspected IRA members of on the oral evidence of a senior police officer. Ruairi O Bradaigh and Joe Cahill were both jailed under this legislation.
In the light of the history of previous security policies there can be no doubt that in their response to the Omagh atrocity, Dublin and London will be anxious to ensure that any major initiative commands widespread community support north and south, while avoiding any risk of destabilizing the progress that has been wrought in the peace process.
Dr Eamon Pheonix is Senior Lecturer in History, Stranmillis College, Belfast.
THE Dublin government's use of internment and other draconian security measures to deal with terrorist threats to life and limb can be traced back to the Irish Civil War in 1922-23 in which some 5,000 died.
The split in the Dail and the IRA over the Treaty led directly to the bitter conflict between the pro-Treaty government of William T Cosgrave and the anti-Treaty IRA (known as the 'irregulars') and their political mentor, former president Eamon de Valera.
Following the death of Michael Collins in an "Irregular' ambush, Cosgrave and his colleagues - mostly former republican activists themselves - determined to stamp out what they saw as an armed conspiracy against the expressed will of the people. In October 1922 the government gave the army special emergency powers to crush those 'engaged in insurrection and rebellion against the state.'
As well as the use of internment - also imposed in the north in the 1920s - those found in possession of illegal arms could be summarily executed.
For their part, the anti-Treatyites set up a rival Republican government 'in exile' with de Valera as president. Then, as now, extreme republicans based their right to wage 'armed struggle' on the 1918 election result and the Second (pre-partition) Dail.
Whereas Collins had hesitated to grapple with former IRA comrades from the Anglo-Irish War, Cosgrave and his associates had no such scruples. Thus, when the IRA placed 30 pro-government TDs on a death-list, the government's response was swift and shattering. Erskine Childers, the IRA's chief propagandist, was summarily executed - ironically for the possession of a miniature revolver presented to him by Michael Collins some months before.
Despite charges of political murder from many quarters, the Cosgrave Cabinet buttressed by the strident support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, continued its hardline stance against a backcloth of ambushes and attacks.
In December 1922, following the assassination of a Government TD, the Cosgrave government ordered the execution without any judicial process of four prominent IRA leaders captured at the beginning of the civil war. One of these, Joe McKelvey was a major IRA figure in Belfast.
In all, 77 republicans were executed by the Cumann na nGaedhael government and 13,000 interned or imprisoned during the ten-month civil strife. Cosgrave's stringent policy was to engender enduring bitterness in the Free State but it was undoubtedly successful in sapping the morale of the IRA.
As a result, de Valera and the South Armagh IRA leader, Frank Aiken (later an Irish Minister of External Affairs and architect of the Lemass-O'Neill meetings) were forced to call a ceasefire in 1923.
But the end of hostilities involved no surrender of arms nor an amnesty for prisoners. Indeed, de Valera, arrested at an election meeting in Ennis after the cessation, was interned for a year in Kilmainham Jail without trial.
De Valera remained on civil terms with the IRA until his return to power in 1932 at the head of a Fianna Fail administration. At first he sought to woo militant republicanism towards constitutional politics, authorising the mass release of IRA prisoners from the previous regime and lifting the order banning the organisation.
However, a significant section of republicanism rejected his step-by-step policy towards the goal of a united republic. In 1936, following the brutal murder of a 72-year old retired Royal Navy admiral in Co Cork, de Valera acted remorselessly against his erstwhile allies.
In June 1936, the IRA was proclaimed an illegal body and its Chief of Staff imprisoned. A stern de Valera told the Dail that the existence of private armies was a recipe for civil war and would not be tolerated. The honeymoon was truly over.
The IRA continued its activities and in 1939 launched a major bombing campaign in Britain which reached a bloody climax in Coventry where a bomb in a crowded city street left five people dead and 80 wounded. Outraged by such atrocities and an embarrassing raid on the Irish Army's armoury at Phoenix Park, de Valera acted rigorously.
Nineteen thirty nine saw the passage of the Offences Against the State Act providing for the internment of suspects. However, the new Act contained legal loop-holes and in 1940, in a determined effort to thwart any IRA threat to Eire's neutrality in the Second World War, the Flanna Fail government introduced an Emergency Powers Act giving it absolute authority to intern Irish citizens as well as aliens during the war emergency.
Over a 1,000 suspects were incarcerated in the Curragh for the duration of the war. This was matched by internment north of the border while, in Britain two IRA men, Barnes and McCormick, were executed by their part in the Coventry bombing.
The events of the 40s, in particular, were to mark out de Valera as one of the IRA's most ruthless antagonists. In all, nine IRA men were executed in Southern Ireland during the war while three others were allowed to die on hunger-strike. Among these was Sean MacCaughey, the IRA's Chief of Staff.
By the end of the war even de Valera's most inveterate critics could not accuse the former 1916 leader of being 'soft' on republican violence.
As a result largely of Dev's repressive measures, the IRA was a spent force by 1945. But it was to re-emerge in the 'border campaign' of 1956-62. Once again, the Dublin and Stormont governments responded to the series of cross-border raids with internment.
This factor together with the almost total lack of nationalist support for the campaign in the north - a fact admitted by the IRA in their ceasefire statement - brought the violence to a desultory end in February 1962.
One of the most striking aspects of the 50s campaign was the high degree of co-operation which existed between the RUC and the Garda Siochana, a fact constantly acknowledged in contemporary Stormont Cabinet papers. This factor, however, was dramatically absent in 1971 when the then Stormont Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner sought to use internment to curb the Provisional IRA.
Then, the almost total alienation of the nationalist population together with poor intelligence and the one-sided nature of the sweeps, ensured that the use of the age-old weapon would prove totally counter-productive.
Short of internment the Fianna Fail and Coalition governments of the 1970s invoked the full rigour of the law against paramilitaries. In December 1972, against a bloody backdrop of loyalist bombs in Dublin, the Dail amended the Offences Against the State Act empowering the courts to imprison suspected IRA members of on the oral evidence of a senior police officer. Ruairi O Bradaigh and Joe Cahill were both jailed under this legislation.
In the light of the history of previous security policies there can be no doubt that in their response to the Omagh atrocity, Dublin and London will be anxious to ensure that any major initiative commands widespread community support north and south, while avoiding any risk of destabilizing the progress that has been wrought in the peace process.
Dr Eamon Pheonix is Senior Lecturer in History, Stranmillis College, Belfast.
Further Information
Publisher: BELFAST TELEGRAPH
Ref: BT/0195
Published Date: 22-Aug-98
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